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1ARTICLE XXII:  DEPOSITARY/IES
by Graham S. Pearson*  & Nicholas A Sims†
Introduction
1.   The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) is considering measures to strengthen the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) through a legally binding instrument.  The pace of the
AHG negotiations has quickened during the past year and there is now a clear political will to
see the negotiation of the Protocol completed as soon as possible before the Fifth Review
Conference in 2001.    It is now evident that several Articles in the draft Protocol are now
largely agreed and will not develop significantly from their current form although a certain
amount of restructuring may be agreed at a later stage.
2.   In Evaluation Paper No 1 it was concluded1 that "the majority of the Articles in the draft
Protocol have now reached the stage when they have had multiple readings and are unlikely
to change significantly during the coming months as the negotiations enter the end-game.   It
is therefore timely to commence the production of a series of Evaluation Papers which will
consider Article by Article the current state of each Article of the Protocol."   This Evaluation
Paper continues this series by considering Article XXII Depositary/ies  on which the AHG
has made good progress with the current rolling text containing six sets of square brackets
providing for two alternative options for the depositary/ies.
Article XXII
3.   In July 1999, the text2 for Article XXII was unchanged from its earlier version and was as
follows:
ARTICLE XXII
DEPOSITARY/IES
The [Secretary-General of the United Nations] [Governments of the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
United States of America] [is] [are] hereby designated as the [Depositary]
[Depositaries] of this Protocol and shall, inter alia:
(a) Promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each
signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession
and the date of the entry into force of this Protocol, and of the receipt of other
notices;
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1Graham S. Pearson, The Strengthened BTWC Protocol:  An Overall Evaluation, Evaluation Paper No. 1,
University of Bradford, July 1999. Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
2United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/46 (Part I), 30 July 1999, Geneva.
2(b) Transmit duly certified copies of this Protocol to the governments of all
signatory and acceding States; and
(c) Register this Protocol pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
The strikethrough version of Article XXII provided3 by the FOC on Legal Issues for further
consideration is identical to that in the draft Protocol as no changes are proposed.
Evaluation
4.   The square brackets show that designation of a Depositary or Depositaries for the
Protocol is still under debate:  the listing of formal depositary functions is not.   That listing
follows the pattern of  the BTWC4  which states:
in Article XIV that
5.  The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and
acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each
instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of entry into force of
this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices.
6.  This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments
pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
and in the second sentence of Article XV that:
Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary
Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
 of Article XXIII in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)5 which states:
ARTICLE XXIII
DEPOSITARY
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary
of this Convention and shall, inter alia:
(a) Promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each
signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession
                                                
3United Nations, Proposals for further consideration by the Friend of the Chair on Legal Issues, BWC/AD
HOC GROUP/FOC/22, 28 July 1999 in Annex IV of Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States
Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/46 (Part II), 4 August 1999,
Geneva.
4United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, General Assembly Resolution 2826
(XXVI), 16 December 1971.
5Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Available on the web at
http://www.opcw.nl
3and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of
other notices;
(b) Transmit duly certified copies of this Convention to the Governments of all
signatory and acceding States; and
(c) Register this Convention pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
and of Article XVI in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)6 which states:
ARTICLE XVI
DEPOSITARY
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the
Depositary of this Treaty and shall receive signatures, instruments of ratification and
instruments of accession.
2.   The Depositary shall promptly inform all States Signatories and acceding States
of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or
accession and the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and of any amendments
and changes thereto, and the receipt of other notices.
3.  The Depositary shall send duly certified copies of this Treaty to the Governments
of the States Signatories and acceding States.
4.  This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
The depositary functions in Article XXII of the draft Protocol are thus not in contention.
5.   The designation of Depositary.  The current draft Protocol contains language for two
alternative depositaries:  the Secretary-General of the United Nations; or the Governments of
the Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.
6.  Insofar as the designation of the three named governments as Depositaries is concerned, it
can be argued that because they are the three Depositary Governments for the BTWC, it
would be illogical to have a different Depositary for its Protocol, especially given the close
relationship between the two instruments in respect of the review process foreseen under
Article XIII of the Protocol.   Moreover, the three governments have special responsibilities
for the operation of the contingency mechanism addressing compliance concerns under
Article V which were conferred upon the Depositaries by the Third Review Conference7 in
1991 and put into practice for the first time when the Consultative Meeting of States Parties
to the BTWC addressed the Thrips palmi  question in 1997 at the request of Cuba8.   It can,
                                                
6Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.   Available at http://www.ctbto.org/ctbto/pdf/cbten.pdf
7United Nations, The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Final Document, Geneva, 9–27 September 1991, BWC/CONF.III/23, Geneva 1992, Part II, page
15-16.
8Graham S. Pearson, Cuban Allegation of BW Attack:  The Final Report, The ASA Newsletter, 98-2, 30 April
1998, p.28.
4however, be argued that this contingency mechanism is -- on the assumption that all BTWC
States Parties also become parties to the Protocol -- but an interim arrangement pending the
entry into force of the Protocol -- as it is noted that the outcome of the Consultative Meeting
specifically stated9 that "the Bureau agreed that the experience of conducting this process
and consultation had shown the importance of establishing as soon as possible an effective
Protocol to strengthen the Convention which is being negotiated in the Ad Hoc Group."
7.  It could also be argued that the Depositaries have special responsibilities for bringing to a
successful conclusion the trilateral process10 which they launched in Moscow on 14
September 1992, although their obligations towards the other States Parties to the BTWC are
less clear in respect of this process than when operating the Convention's own machinery, as
in the 1997 Consultative Meeting, for the handling of compliance concerns.
 8.   As for the designation of the UN Secretary-General as Depositary, it can be argued that
the precedents of the 1993 CWC, the 1996 CTBT and the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mines
Convention11 are more relevant to a protocol drafted in the late 1990s than the pattern of 1963
to 1972.    Indeed, if we examine the pattern of depositaries in some of the treaties that
opened for signature in the 1960s and early 1970s, it can be seen that the designation of the
three named Governments was not universal and ceased after the 1972 BTWC.
Date Treaty Article Depositary
Depositary
ratification
for EIF?
18 Apr 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations12
49 UN S-G No
24 Apr 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations13
75 UN S-G No
5 Aug 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty14 III.2 UK,  US and
Soviet Union
Yes
7 Mar 1966 Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination15
19.1 UN S-G No
27 Jan 1967 Peaceful Uses of Outer Space16 XIV.2 UK,  US and
Soviet Union
Yes
                                                
9United Kingdom Permanent Representation to the Conference on Disarmament, Letter to All States Parties to
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention dated 15 December 1997, Geneva.
10Richard Boucher, US Department of State, Spokesman, Joint US/UK/Russian Statement on Biological
Weapons, 14 September 1992.
11Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer or Anti-Personnel Mines and
on Their Destruction, 18 September 1997.  Available on the web at http://www.mines.gc.ca/english/documents/
treaty.html
12Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocols.  Available at http://www.tufts.edu/
departments/fletcher/multi/texts/BH408.txt
13Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol.   Available at http://www.tufts.edu/
departments/fletcher/multi/texts/BH444.txt
14Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.   Known as the
Limited Test Ban Treaty or the Partial Test Ban Treaty.  Available at http://www.acda.gov/treaties/itbt1.htm#2
15International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.  Available at http:// www.
tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/texts/BH490.txt
16Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.  Available at http://www.acda.gov/treaties/ space1. htm
5Date Treaty Article Depositary
Depositary
ratification
for EIF?
22 Apr 1968 Rescue and Return of Astronauts and
Objects17
7.2 UK,  US and
Soviet Union
Yes
1 Jul 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty18 IX.2 UK,  US and
Soviet Union
Yes
23 May 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties19
82 UN S-G No
16 Dec 1970 Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft20
13.2 UK,  US and
Soviet Union
No
11 Feb 1971 Sea-Bed Treaty21 X.2 UK,  US and
Soviet Union
Yes
23 Sept 1971 Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation22
15.3 UK,  US and
Soviet Union
No
29 Mar 1972 International Liability for Damage caused
by Space Objects23
XXIV. 2 UK,  US and
Soviet Union
No
10 Apr 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention24
XIV.2 UK,  US and
Soviet Union
Yes
30 Nov 1973 Suppression and Punishment of
Apartheid25
14.1 UN S-G No
14 Dec 1973 Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
against Internationally Protected Persons26
15 UN S-G No
14 Jan 1975 Registration of Objects Launched into
Outer Space27
VIII.2 UN S-G No
                                                
17Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into
Outer Space.  Available at http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/texts/BH523.txt
18United Nations, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Treaty Series, Vol. 729, I. No. 10485,
168-175, 1970.
19Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  Available at http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/
texts/BH538.txt
20Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, The Hague, 16 December 1970.
21Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.   Available at http://www.acda.gov/treaties/
seabed1.htm
22Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.  Available at http://
www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/ texts/BH586.txt
23Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects.  Available at http://www.tufts.
edu/departments/fletcher/multi/ texts/BH595.txt
24United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, General Assembly Resolution 2826
(XXVI), 16 December 1971.
25International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the International Crime of Apartheid, 30
November 1973, New York.
26Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
including Diplomatic Agents, 14 December 1973, New York.
27Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.   Available at http://www.tufts.edu/
departments/fletcher/multi/ texts/BH653.txt
6Date Treaty Article Depositary
Depositary
ratification
for EIF?
18 May 1977 Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques28
IX.2 UN S-G No
9.   As we have noted in our Evaluation Paper on Article XX Entry into Force 29, there is a
clear transition during the 1960s and 1970s away from the triple-depositary mechanism and
from the requirement for prior deposit of instruments by the three states to a system in which
the UN Secretary-General is the Depositary and deposit by a varying number of States is
required for entry into force.  In this respect, there is particular interest that although the 1967
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Convention requires the deposit of instruments of ratification
by the three Depositaries for entry into force, the two subsequent associated Conventions --
the 1972 International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects Convention and the
1975 Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space Convention -- do not, with the
former having the triple-depositary mechanism and the latter having the UN Secretary-
General as Depositary.  Similarly, this same trend is also shown by the much more recent
1996 CTBT, which can be regarded as a successor to the LTBT, and which has the Secretary-
General of the UN as the Depositary as do the CWC and the Anti-Personnel Mines Treaty.
 10.  The use of the triple-depositary mechanism in nine treaties, of which the BTWC was the
last, can be seen as a temporary device limited to alleviating the adverse impact of East-West
problems on participation in multilateral treaties.  It was designed to get round problems of
non-recognition or absence of diplomatic relations by offering a choice among the three
Depositary Governments with which to deposit instruments of ratification and accession.   It
lost much of its usefulness once the Federal Republic of Germany and the German
Democratic Republic were admitted simultaneously to membership of the United Nations in
1973, and of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1975, with corresponding
extension of recognition and diplomatic relations.   Although the German case is only one of
several which the triple-depositary mechanism was designed to address, it is evident that no
treaty has chosen to make use of that mechanism since the BTWC in 1972.    The use of the
mechanism in the Protocol would thus be anachronistic:  it cannot offer the prospect of
increasing the overall roster of States Parties to the Protocol by overcoming East-West
problems, as it could -- if only marginally and for a short time -- for the BTWC in 1972.   The
UN Secretary-General is thus the 'natural' choice of Depositary and does not require special
justification.
11.   There are clearly further arguments that can be considered.   For example, it could be
argued that the Depositary Governments are vital to the functioning of the BTWC and that it
would make for an awkward, and unnecessary, dislocation if they were not also to be
designated as Depositaries for the Protocol.   However, it should not be overlooked that the
triple-depositary mechanism in some respects is cumbersome.   It has not been outstandingly
effective in providing reliably definitive lists of States Parties and of Signatory States.   Such
lists have fortunately been produced periodically by the United Nations, most recently by the
                                                
28Convention on Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.
Available at http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/ texts/BH700.txt
29Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Article XX:  Entry into Force, Evaluation Paper No. 5, University of
Bradford, September 1999. Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
7Secretariat for the Ad Hoc Group30, but the requirement to respect the Depositaries' position
as the only authoritative source of such information has been a complicating factor.
12.   The words inter alia  preceding (a), (b) and (c) in Article XXII of the draft Protocol
show that the formal responsibilities specified in those three sub-paragraphs do not exhaust
the functions of the Depositary/ies for the Protocol.  They constitute a permissive provision
and suggest that the assumption of further functions is clearly envisaged.   One of the most
important additional functions which needs to be performed for the Protocol is recruitment.
This includes, in particular, the encouragement of ratification by original signatories so as to
bring the Protocol into force, and thereafter the promotion of universality, although at that
stage the future BTWC Protocol Organization will have a major role to play as noted below.
It is worth considering the potential role of the Depositary/ies in encouraging wider
participation in the Protocol, before and after entry into force, as this is not a responsibility
which the Protocol formally allocates to anyone.
13.   Efforts at recruitment to the BTWC itself have been spasmodic at best, and not confined
to the Depositary Governments.   Australia was particularly active in encouraging wider
BTWC participation in the Asia-Pacific region before the Third Review Conference in 1991,
and the European Union countries (including one of the Depositaries) likewise undertook
demarches, particularly towards African non-parties, at that time.   Non-governmental
organizations have also sought to encourage non-parties to ratify or accede to the BTWC;
and successive Review Conferences have attempted to encourage the process of widening
participation by issuing general exhortations.  Nevertheless almost 50 states remain outside,
so the combined effect of all these efforts has thus far fallen short of universality.
14.  However, it needs to be recognised that once the Protocol has entered into force then the
BTWC Organization can, under the guidance of its Conference of States Parties, be expected
to undertake many of the promotional functions that encourage universality.   The
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has been energetic in
recruiting new States Parties to the CWC and the OPCW report31 on the implementation of
the CWC in 1998 noted that
the number of States parties, which had increased from 87 at EIF to 105 on 31
December 1997, grew further to 121 exactly one year later.  This rapid rate of
continuing accession to the Convention (16 States parties, or 15%, in the past year),
unprecedented in the history of multilateral disarmament agreements, reflected the
growing recognition by the international community of the urgency of the task of the
global elimination of chemical weapons and of the pivotal role which the OPCW
plays in this endeavour....The Organisation's efforts to achieve universality of the
Convention continued at various levels.
It can therefore be expected that the future BTWC Organization will be equally energetic in
pursuing universality for the Protocol.   This will be particularly important for the BTWC
Protocol because of the importance of minimizing the extent and duration of a two-tier
                                                
30The latest such listing is United Nations, List of States Parties and List of Signatories to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/INF.20, 20 July 1999
31Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Report of the Organization on the Implementation of
the Convention (1 January - 31 December 1998), Conference of States Parties, Fourth Session, 28 June - 2 July
1999, C-IV/5, 2 July 1999.
8structure of obligation as between those BTWC States Parties that accept the Protocol and
those which do not.
15.  As we conclude in our Evaluation Paper on Article XX Entry into Force32  that entry into
force should not require the prior deposit of the instruments of ratification of the three
Depositaries of the BTWC, the option of having the three BTWC Depositaries being
designated as Depositaries for the Protocol without requiring the three Depositaries to
deposit their instruments of ratification prior to entry into force of the Protocol could also be
considered;  such an arrangement would effectively follow the precedent of the 1971
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation33 and
the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects34.
However, such an option appears to offer no advantages and is therefore not considered
further.
16. We conclude that the case for the three Depositaries of the BTWC also being the
Depositaries of the Protocol is not compelling and therefore based on the overall argument we
recommend that the Depositary in Article XXII should be the UN Secretary-General in line
with prevailing practice in the multilateral disarmament agreements of the 1990s.
Strike-through text for Article XXII
17.  Our view is that Article XXII should be based on the UN Secretary-General as the
Depositary as follows:
ARTICLE XXII
DEPOSITARY/IES
The [ Secretary-General of the United Nations ] [Governments of the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
United States of America][ is ][are] hereby designated as the [ Depositary
][Depositaries] of this Protocol and shall, inter alia:
(a) Promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each
signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession
and the date of the entry into force of this Protocol, and of the receipt of other
notices;
(b) Transmit duly certified copies of this Protocol to the governments of all
signatory and acceding States; and
(c) Register this Protocol pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
                                                
32Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Article XX:  Entry into Force, Evaluation Paper No. 5, University of
Bradford, September 1999. Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
33Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.  Available at http://
www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/ texts/BH586.txt
34Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects.  Available at http://www.tufts.
edu/departments/fletcher/multi/ texts/BH595.txt
